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THE OFFICER HAS NO ROBES: A FORMALIST SOLUTION
TO THE EXPANSION OF QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
ABSTRACT
In 1871, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act. Section 1 is now more
commonly known as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the primary vehicle for constitutional tort
litigation. Commonly interpreted against a background of tort principles,
federal courts have imported—contrary to the plain language of the law—
several immunities. This Comment focuses on one immunity in particular:
absolute judicial immunity.
Despite the “judicial” qualifier, absolute judicial immunity has been
extended to a great deal of parties who are not judges. Commentators have
decried this expansion and criticized lower federal courts for subverting civilrights enforcement, exacerbating a pronounced rights-remedy gap, and
departing from Supreme Court decisions that putatively cabin absolute judicial
immunity. This Comment focuses on that last critique in particular.
Although language in Supreme Court opinions certainly supports restricting
absolute judicial immunity, this Comment proposes that the Supreme Court’s
muddled methodology in this area supports the expansion of absolute judicial
immunity. Fidelity to Supreme Court precedent will further expand absolute
judicial immunity. This Comment proposes one solution to further the values
commentators believe are disserved by the outgrowth of absolute judicial
immunity: a formalist regime that clothes only judges with absolute immunity
and the rest with qualified immunity.
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INTRODUCTION
Absolute judicial immunity has been a feature of the common law since at
least 1871 in the United States.1 The justifications originally offered by the
Supreme Court in Bradley v. Fisher continue to ring true today—to the Supreme
Court, at the least. Absolute judicial immunity offers a judge independence and
freedom to make decisions without fear of retribution.2 Immunity properly
allows for error correction to be channeled to either the political or appellate
processes as opposed to being fought through new, potentially vexatious
litigation.3 Recognizing the strength of absolute immunity, the Court has
attempted to restrain judicial immunity by crafting a part-historical,4 partfunctional,5 part-policy based6 approach when determining whether to extend
immunity to non-judicial officers.
Despite the Supreme Court’s assertion that it has historically been “quite
sparing”7 in recognizing absolute immunity claims, commentators have
observed an “expansion” of judicial immunity beyond what the Supreme Court
has commanded.8 As noted by Professor Margaret Johns, the immunity has
moved beyond the judicial robe and now clothes medical-experts,9 child-

1

Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871).
Id. at 347–49; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363–64 (1978).
3 Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 350; see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
4 See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1986) (“Our initial inquiry is whether an official
claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts.”).
5 Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 434, 437 (1993) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
499–500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
6 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978) (examining procedural safeguards and concluding that the
risk of an unconstitutional act is outweighed by the need for an independent decision-maker).
7 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
8 See generally Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion of Absolute
Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L. REV. 265 (2006); David M. Coriell, Note,
The Transferred Immunity Trap: Misapplication of Section 1983 Immunities, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 985 (2015).
9 D.T.B. v. Farmer, 114 F. App’x 446, 447 (3d Cir. 2004); Morstad v. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 147
F.3d 741, 742 (8th Cir. 1998); McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1083–84 (3d Cir. 1992). The Third Circuit
has been particularly active in crafting judicial immunity for mental-health professionals. See Tammy Lander,
Note, Do Court-Appointed Mental Health Professionals Get a Free Ride in the Third Circuit? An Examination
of the Latest Extensions of Judicial Immunity, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 895, 909 (2004). According to Lander,
this has created somewhat of a circuit split. Id. at 910–14. Professor Johns has noted the circuits are split as well
on whether to apply the immunity to child-protective workers, certain parole-board members, land-use officials,
and to medical-board or medical peer-review committees. See Johns, supra note 8, at 267 n.5.
2
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protective workers,10 arbitrators,11 receivers,12 and prison-hearing officers,13 to
name a few.14 These decisions have been criticized for exacerbating a rightsremedy gap, undermining civil-rights enforcement, and—most relevant to this
Comment—“misinterpret[ing] Supreme Court decisions that limit the
application of the doctrine.”15
This Comment argues that lower federal courts have not misinterpreted
Supreme Court decisions in this field. Supreme Court precedent, rather, is in
accord with the extension of absolute judicial immunity. To reverse the
expansion and bolster civil-rights protections, this Comment proposes one
solution: a formalist approach to judicial immunity.
This Comment proceeds in three Parts. Part I deals with common law,
§ 1983, and judicial immunity. It presents and explains the creation of judicial
immunity and its framework. Further, Part I introduces quasi-judicial immunity,
the label attached to absolute judicial immunity given to a non-judge, and
presents the analytical model used by the Supreme Court to determine whether
absolute immunity is appropriate.16
Part II concerns the extension of absolute immunity and is composed of two
sections. First, it examines the operation of absolute immunity in a variety of
cases. Second, it deals with the concerns articulated by various observers and
reconciles the examined cases with Supreme Court language.
Part III presents the argument for formalism. The argument proceeds in two
sections. First, it outlines the rationale behind a formalist application of judicial
immunity and advocates that qualified immunity cover the denuded public

10 Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 2002); Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2001);
Fleming v. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 889 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a guardian ad litem enjoys absolute immunity).
11 For a comprehensive overview of quasi-judicial immunity in the arbitration context, see Robert M.
Carroll, Quasi-Judicial Immunity: The Arbitrator’s Shield or Sword?, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 137.
12 For an example, see Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 373–74 (5th Cir. 1995).
13 Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 112–13 (2d Cir. 1998) (state parole officer); Jones v. Moore, 986 F.2d
251, 253 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (parole board member); Shelly v. Johnson, 849 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir.
1988) (per curiam); Johnson v. R.I. Parole Bd. Members, 815 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (parole board
members).
14 For an overview of the listed categories (and more), see Johns, supra note 8, at 276–314.
15 Id. at 267.
16 As this section does not break new ground, readers who are familiar with the subject may find it useful
to proceed to Part II or III.
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officials.17 Second, it examines how formalism would operate in § 1983
litigation and applies the approach to demonstrate its benefits.
I. THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND, § 1983, AND JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
This Part addresses the common law background, § 1983, and the creation
and framework for judicial immunity, both absolute and quasi. First, this Part
details the origin of § 1983 as well as how the Supreme Court has interpreted
the statute in light of the common law. Second, this Part introduces the creation
and importation of absolute judicial immunity into § 1983. Third, this Part
discusses the quasi-judicial immunity framework.
A. The Common Law Background and § 1983
Congress originally articulated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act
in 1871, during the Reconstruction Era.18 The Supreme Court has inferred three
purposes from the 42nd Congress’s passage of the Act: (1) to “override certain
kinds of state laws,” (2) to provide “a remedy where state law [fails],” and (3)
“to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory,
was not available in practice.”19 Practically, § 1983 provides a “tort-like
remedy”20 for persons whose federally protected rights are deprived by state
officials under the “color of [law].”21 To constrain the broad, forceful language

17 Although a formalist approach has not been advocated for by scholars in this field, commentators have
proposed for qualified immunity to replace quasi-judicial immunity. See, e.g., Johns, supra note 8, at 314.
18 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961). The Act was officially titled “An Act to Enforce the
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes.” 17
Stat. 13 (1871). It is commonly referred to as both the “Civil Rights Act of 1871” and the “Ku Klux Act.” See
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 (“[Section 1983] came onto the books as § 1 of the Ku Klux Act.”); Jack M. Beermann,
A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 51 (1989)
(referring to the “Civil Rights Act of 1871 (‘§ 1983’)”). Monroe refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as § 1979, Monroe,
365 U.S. at 171, but this was later recodified as § 1983, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and will be referred to as § 1983
in this Comment.
19 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173–74.
20 Beermann, supra note 18, at 51; see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1504–05 (2012) (“The new
federal claim created by § 1983 differs in important ways from those pre-existing torts. It is broader in that it
reaches . . . violations that do not correspond to any previously known tort. But it is narrower in that it applies
only to tortfeasors who act under color of state law.” (citations omitted)).
21 While § 1983 expressly deals with deprivation arising under the color of state law, the Supreme Court
has read § 1983 to encompass actions against federal officials. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971). Section 1983 actions can also be maintained against
municipalities and local governmental agencies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
The logic that extends § 1983 actions to federal agents does not similarly extend § 1983 actions to federal
agencies. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994).
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of § 1983,22 the Supreme Court tasked the federal judiciary to read § 1983
“against the background of tort liability” that was in place in 1871.23
The Supreme Court has relied heavily on the common law, as it existed in
1871,24 to import absolute immunities25 into § 1983, although none are expressly
stated. The Court has defended its historical approach to the immunity question
as partly functional.26 The Court has explicitly noted that the extension of
22

The statute currently states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
23 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187; see Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993) (“[S]ome officials
perform ‘special functions’ which, because of their similarity to functions that would have been immune when
Congress enacted § 1983, deserve absolute protection from damages liability.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553–54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of
judges . . . .”).
24 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553–54 (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the
immunity of judges . . . .”).
25 Absolute immunity must be contrasted with qualified immunity. Absolute immunity applies irrespective
of motive, and attaches to tasks, not offices. Erwin Chemerinsky, Absolute Immunity: General Principles and
Recent Developments, 24 TOURO L. REV. 473, 475 (2008). Thus, a judicial officer receives immunity for judicial
actions but not for administrative or criminal actions. Id.; see also Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 64 (9th
Cir. 1974) (holding that a judge’s physical assault was not a judicial act, so judicial immunity was unavailable).
Qualified immunity attaches to public officials. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). The framework
requires an objective inquiry into whether a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 818. The plaintiff must make out a violation of a constitutional
right and the right must be clearly established at the time of the violation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
232 (2009). Both immunities work to protect the defendant from suit itself, not just from liability. Id. at 231
(qualified immunity); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (judicial immunity).
26 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 810–11 (“[I]n general our cases have followed a ‘functional’ approach to immunity
law. We have recognized that the judicial . . . functions require absolute immunity.”); accord Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 492 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that “[while] common-law tort rules . . . [or]
principles . . . widely understood at the time § 1983 was enacted [by] the 42nd Congress” are applied, the Court
will refuse to “displace statutory analysis [and decline] to import even well-settled common law rules ‘if [the
statute’s] history or purpose counsel against [application]’” (emphasis added)). Noted Constitutional scholar
Erwin Chemerinsky has observed the same, explaining that the Supreme Court takes both a “historical and
functional” approach to absolute immunity questions. See Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 473. Professor Jeffries
refers to the focus on the nature of the Act as “‘essentialist’ or ‘definitional,’” instead of functional. John C.
Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 217 (2013). Under his view, a
“functional” analysis would tie the scope of the immunity to its rationale. Id. Thus, the term “essentialist,” is
designed “to signal the lack of concern with [the] rationale [supporting the immunity].” Id.
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immunity must not be an exercise in the craft of judicial policymaking,27 but an
exercise in statutory interpretation in light of the 42nd Congress’s “likely intent”
in constructing § 1983.28 Thus, the Court has described its analytical approach
not as one that merely copies and pastes 1871 tort law into modern law,29 but
instead as one that adapts the varied principles supporting 1871 immunities and
applies them to burgeoning contexts.30
B. The Creation of and Framework for Judicial Immunity
Judicial immunity, as it is understood today, received its first extended
treatment in Bradley v. Fisher in 1871.31 But the Supreme Court did not
affirmatively recognize judicial immunity in the § 1983 context until Pierson v.
Ray in 1967.32 Although affirmatively recognized, the Supreme Court did not
articulate a framework for determining judicial immunity until Stump v.
Sparkman in 1978.33 This section will examine each decision in turn.
In Bradley, the plaintiff was a member of the bar of the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia and the defendant was a justice of the court.34 The
plaintiff alleged that shortly after confronting the defendant justice for having
“accosted” him in a rude manner during trial, the justice retaliated by directing
an order to disbar the plaintiff and remove him from practicing in the Supreme
Court of the District.35 The plaintiff filed suit for damages.36
27

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986) (“We reemphasize that our role is to interpret the intent of
Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are guided in interpreting
Congress’s intent by the common-law tradition.”).
28 Id.; Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (“[O]ur role is ‘not to make a freewheeling policy choice,’
but rather to discern Congress’ likely intent in enacting § 1983.”). But see David Achtenberg, Immunity Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 500–
01 (1992) (describing the various interpretive approaches the Court has used to answer the immunity question
and how the approaches are inconsistent with the 42nd Congress’s legislative will).
29 Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012) (“While the Court’s functional approach is tied to the
common law’s identification of the functions that merit the protection of absolute immunity, the Court’s
precedents have not mechanically duplicated the precise scope of the absolute immunity that the common law
provided to protect those functions.”).
30 Id. at 1503–05 (discussing the creation of prosecutorial immunity and its reliance on post-1871 cases).
31 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871). The Court first addressed the question of judicial immunity in 1868.
Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868). The Randall Court, however, offered a formulation for
judicial immunity that differs dramatically from the now-standard formulation given in Bradley. See infra note
43.
32 386 U.S. 547, 554–55 (1967).
33 435 U.S. 349, 359–60 (1978).
34 Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 344.
35 Id. at 344.
36 Id. at 345.
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The Court held that the defendant was not liable for damages and was
absolutely immune from suit, emphasizing that the defendant functionally
performed a “judicial act,” to which liability cannot attach.37 The Court reasoned
that a judicial act “cannot [subject the judicial officer] to responsibility for it in
a civil action”;38 otherwise, judicial officers would act “[with] apprehension”39
and the judiciary would be “weak[ened].”40 Perhaps cramped by institutional
inertia, the Court grounded its holding primarily in the language of tradition: the
issue had been settled “for many centuries” and was “deep[ly] root[ed] in the
common law.”41 The Court did not revisit the logic underscoring the immunity42
and denied the suggestion that immunity cannot attach when a judicial officer
acts maliciously or corruptly.43 Judicial immunity, the Court stated, attaches
irrespective of the judicial officer’s motives.44

37

Id. at 347.
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 For a detailed explanation of the justifications for judicial immunity, see Jeffries, supra note 26, at 212–
13. Professor Jeffries points to the availability of an alternative remedy—appeal—and the potentially destructive
cost (stated explicitly in the Bradley opinion) of allowing an “additional remedial structure” through litigation.
Id. at 212. Professor Block, in his seminal and oft-cited treatment of judicial immunity, noted four policy bases
from the English common law. J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity,
1980 DUKE L.J. 879, 885–87. The four policy bases are readily apparent in the Bradley opinion: (1) “the need
for finality,” (2) protecting judicial independence, (3) “maintaining public confidence,” and (4) protecting
“independent, conscientious judges” from prosecution for developing the law. Id.
43 Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347 (“The purity of [the judges’] motives cannot in this way be the subject
of judicial inquiry.”). Randall suggested such a rule. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868).
Bradley overruled Randall in that respect, stating the Randall suggestion was “not . . . a correct statement of the
law.” Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
44 Id. at 354. This proposition, and the Court’s reliance on the common law and history, has been heavily
criticized. Professor Block surveyed the state of judicial immunity in 1871 and concluded that the majority of
the states did not accord absolute immunity. Block, supra note 42, at 899. A minority of states provided absolute
immunity with six states voiding that immunity if judges acted maliciously. Id. (citing Note, Liability of Judicial
Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 326–27 (1969)). The critique that the Supreme Court either
misunderstood or ignored history has been repeated often by scholars. See Achtenberg, supra note 28, at 500–
01; Don Kates, Jr., Immunity of State Judges Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered,
65 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 621–23 (1970); Sheldon Nahmod, From the Courtroom to the Street: Court Orders and
Section 1983, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 613, 617–18 (2002). Justice Douglas believed that the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 unequivocally showed that judicial misconduct was among the chief evils
§ 1983 was meant to remediate. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 563 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[The 42nd
Congress] recognized that certain members of the judiciary were instruments of oppression and were partially
responsible for the wrongs to be remedied.”). Indeed, because the literal words of § 1983 require liability to be
imposed upon any state official who violates an individual’s constitutional rights, the Court’s wholesale
importation of immunities is unfounded. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). However, because this topic is not the main
focus of this Comment, it will not join the scholarly fray.
38
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The Bradley Court did distinguish, however, between judicial actions taken
in “excess of jurisdiction” versus actions taken in the “clear absence of all
jurisdiction over the subject-matter.”45 The former would be clothed with
immunity, the latter would not.46 For example, if a probate court proceeded to
try a party for a criminal offense, the judicial officer would not receive absolute
immunity.47 If, however, a criminal judge held the defendant’s conduct to be
illegal, even though no law criminalized the behavior, absolute immunity would
attach as the judicial officer acted only in “excess of his jurisdiction.”48
Bradley did not answer the immunity question within the § 1983 framework.
The Court decided for the first time whether judicial immunity was applicable
in a § 1983 suit in Pierson v. Ray.49 The petitioners were African-American and
white Episcopal clergymen who attempted to use segregated facilities at a bus
terminal in Jackson, Mississippi.50 The petitioners were arrested and charged
with violating a Mississippi “breach the peace” law.51 A municipal justice
convicted the petitioners.52 The conviction was appealed and overturned; shortly
thereafter, the petitioners brought an action for damages under § 1983.53 The
Fifth Circuit held the judge was immune from liability under § 1983 for acts
committed within his judicial jurisdiction.54 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether a local judge may face liability for damages under
§ 1983 for an unconstitutional conviction.55
The Court held the justice received judicial immunity.56 The Court fell back
upon the common law and Bradley v. Fisher, holding that § 1983 did not abolish
the “settled principle of law” that immunity attaches to “judges for acts within
the judicial role.”57 Chief Justice Warren reaffirmed that immunity attaches even
if the judge is malicious or corrupt because “the benefit of the public” demands

45

Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351.
Id. at 352.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 386 U.S. 547, 551 (1967).
50 Id. at 549.
51 Id. The arrest of the clergymen occurred in 1961, four years before the statute was found to be
unconstitutional as applied to similar facts. Id.; see Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965).
52 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 549.
53 Id. at 550.
54 Id.; Pierson v. Ray, 352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965).
55 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 551.
56 Id. at 553.
57 Id. at 554.
46
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judicial protection.58 The principles vindicated, according to the Court, were the
independence of the judiciary and the proper transference of error correction
from § 1983 actions to appellate courts.59
The Pierson Court’s discussion of judicial immunity was rather perfunctory.
Justice Douglas devoted his entire dissent to dissecting whether the 42nd
Congress abrogated judicial immunity;60 the majority, however, found “no
difficulty” in concluding that the 42nd Congress did not.61 The Court did not
devote full attention to judicial immunity until the infamous case of Stump v.
Sparkman,62 in which the Court first supplied the analytical framework that has
since plagued lower federal courts.
In Stump, the mother of a mentally challenged fifteen-year-old girl petitioned
Judge Stump of the Circuit Court of DeKalb County, Indiana, to have a
sterilization procedure performed on her daughter.63 The petition alleged,
without evidence, that the daughter was “somewhat retarded” and had been
“associating with ‘older youth or young men.’”64 The petition concluded it was
within the daughter’s interests to undergo sterilization lest an “unfortunate
circumstance” occur.65 Judge Stump approved the petition ex parte: the daughter
was not notified, no guardian ad litem was appointed, and no hearing was held.66
Shortly after, respondent had the tubal ligation procedure performed upon her.67
She was under the impression that her appendix was being removed.68
Two years later, the respondent married but was unable to become pregnant;
she then discovered that she had been sterilized.69 The respondent filed suit

58

Id.
Id.
60 Id. at 558–67 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (concluding that § 1983 did abrogate judicial immunity).
61 Id. at 553–55; see supra text accompanying notes 56–59.
62 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Stump has been the subject of much criticism. See, e.g., Block, supra note 42, at
916–20; Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Immunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 237, 237–44 (1979);
Sheldon H. Nahmod, Persons Who Are Not “Persons”: Absolute Individual Immunity Under Section 1983, 28
DePaul L. Rev. 1, 19–20 (1978); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial
Impunity, 64 VA. L. REV. 833, 835–36 (1978).
63 Stump, 435 U.S. at 351.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 360. The Seventh Circuit noted that Judge Stump had failed to take “the slightest steps to ensure
that [the minor’s] rights were protected.” Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 176 (7th Cir. 1977).
67 Stump, 435 U.S. at 353.
68 Id.
69 Id.
59
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against Judge Stump and others, seeking damages.70 The district court held that
Judge Stump was entitled to judicial immunity as the actions taken were within
his jurisdiction, his “erroneous view of the law” aside.71 The Seventh Circuit
reversed and held that Judge Stump had no jurisdiction because the relevant
sterilization statutes only encompassed sterilization of “institutionalized
persons” and contained no express authority otherwise.72 Further, the Seventh
Circuit held that the immunity was “forfeited,” as the judicial act failed to
comport with due process.73
The Supreme Court paid sparse attention to the facts defining the “judicial
act” Judge Stump had taken.74 The Court reiterated its holding in Bradley and
Pierson, stating that the correct inquiry in judicial immunity cases is whether,
“at the time [the judge] took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the
subject-matter before him.”75 In response to this inquiry, the Court noted that
Indiana law granted Judge Stump “original exclusive jurisdiction in all cases at
law and in equity whatsoever . . . .”76 Thus, the Court held that Judge Stump had
jurisdiction over the matter.77 The Court further held that the lack of direct case
law or statutory authorization to grant a sterilization did not matter; in the
Court’s view, the lack of case law prohibiting Judge Stump from granting a
sterilization was the determinative fact.78
Justice White then addressed the Seventh Circuit’s holding that Judge Stump
forfeited immunity by undertaking “an illegitimate exercise of his common law
power.”79 The Court stated that such analysis “misconceives” judicial immunity;
the correct inquiry is not whether a judicial act suffered a procedural defect, but
whether the act was taken (1) within the jurisdiction of the court and (2) could
properly be characterized as a judicial act.80 Having already answered the former
by reference to the Indiana statute, the Court held that Judge Stump indeed
performed a judicial act.81 The majority dismissed the argument that procedural

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Id. at 354–55.
Id. at 355, 358.
Id. at 355.
See Nagel, supra note 62, at 239.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356.
Id. at 357 (emphasis added) (quoting IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (1975)).
Id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 359–60.
Id. at 362.
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formality is a relevant inquiry.82 Rather, it held that the only question is whether
the function performed is one “normally performed by a judge, and to the
expectations of the parties.”83 The opinion boiled down the formula to a key, but
logically circular, question: “whether [the parties] dealt with the judge in his
judicial capacity.”84 Because a state judge is often called upon to approve
petitions relating to minors, and because the respondent’s mother went to the
judge with such expectation, the Court concluded that Judge Stump acted within
his judicial capacity.85 Having answered the jurisdictional question and the
judicial “act” question in Judge Stump’s favor, the Court held he was immune
from damages.86
After Stump, the current framework for judicial immunity is clear. The
relevant inquiries are only whether the act was taken within the judge’s judicial
capacity; if so, then immunity applies unless the action was taken in complete
absence of jurisdiction.87 The Supreme Court has made clear that the inquiry is
a generalized one, not a particular one.88 Thus, for example, if a judge orders
police to seize a wayward attorney “forcibly and with excessive force,” the Court
will not frame the act as whether a judge has the power to seize someone
forcibly, but whether a judge may direct “court officers to a bring a person who
is in the courthouse before him.”89

82 Id. at 360 (“This Court has not had occasion to consider, for purposes of the judicial immunity doctrine,
the necessary attributes of a judicial act; but it has previously rejected the argument, somewhat similar to the
one raised here, that the lack of formality involved . . . prevented it from being a [judicial act].”).
83 Id. at 362.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 364.
87 Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991) (per curiam).
88 Id. at 13 (“[W]e look to the particular act’s relation to a general function normally performed by a
judge . . . .”).
89 Id. at 10–12.
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C. Quasi-Judicial Immunity: Framework for Extension
Quasi-judicial immunity90 refers to the extension of absolute judicial
immunity to non-judicial officers,91 for example92: medical experts,93 childprotective workers,94 prison-hearing officers,95 state-administrative tribunal
officers,96 medical licensing boards,97 zoning-board members,98 and
arbitrators.99
The process through which a lower federal court extends immunity requires
some elaboration. Thankfully, the Supreme Court has been quite active in both
extending, and refusing to extend, judicial immunity.100

90 See, e.g., Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Given the [judicial] nature of their duties,
the counselors were granted ‘quasi-judicial’ immunity.”).
91 For a recent student note describing quasi-judicial immunity as also encompassing witnesses, counsel,
and members of the jury, see Coriell, supra note 8, at 990. This Comment does not consider the extension of
absolute judicial immunity in those specific factual contexts.
92 For a comprehensive analysis of quasi-judicial immunity being applied in various contexts, including
those listed, see generally Johns, supra note 8, at 276–314. This Comment examines some of the specific factual
contexts Professor Johns surveyed, but not all are listed. Further, this Comment does not seek to reiterate the
critiques proffered by Professor Johns. Instead, this Comment will defend the lower federal courts’ extension,
not because they are proper, but because the Supreme Court’s muddled methodology has dictated the expanding
specter of judicial immunity.
93 D.T.B. v. Farmer, 114 F. App’x 446, 447 (3d Cir. 2004); Morstad v. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 147
F.3d 741, 742 (8th Cir. 1998); McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1992); Duzynski v. Nosal, 324
F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1963).
94 Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 94 (1st Cir. 2002); Hughes, 242 F.3d at 126; Fleming v. Asbill, 42
F.3d 886, 889 (4th Cir. 1994); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989).
95 Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (state parole officer); Jones v. Moore, 986 F.2d
251, 253 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (parole board member); Shelly v. Johnson, 849 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam) (hearings officer); Johnson v. R.I. Parole Bd. Members, 815 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1987) (parole board
members).
96 Dixon v. Clem, 492 F.3d 665, 674–75 (6th Cir. 2007).
97 Applewhite v. Briber, 506 F.3d 181, 182 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008); Guttman v.
Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006); Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 924 (9th Cir.
2004); Wang v. N.H. Bd. of Registration in Med., 55 F.3d 698, 699 (1st Cir. 1995). But see DiBlasio v. Novello,
344 F.3d 292, 301–02 (2d Cir. 2003).
98 Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 322 (3d Cir. 2006); Bass v. Attardi, 868 F.2d 45, 50 (3d Cir. 1989)
(per curiam).
99 See supra note 11.
100 The following cases are of particular importance: Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429,
436–37 (1993); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 220–21 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 194
(1985); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 480 (1978).

FOROUZAN GALLEYSPROOFS3

2016]

9/26/2016 8:49 AM

THE OFFICER HAS NO ROBES

135

It is well established that absolute immunity is to be rarely granted101 and
limited only to functions that have a common law analogue.102 For judicial
immunity, as noted prior, the relevant inquiry is whether the actor is performing
a “judicial act.”103 Forrester v. White104 counseled further that this inquiry
protects adjudicative functions; for example, a judicial officer is not protected
for personnel decisions, which are decidedly administrative in nature.105
Procedural safeguards assuring independent judgments are characteristics of
a judicial or adjudicative proceeding.106 In Butz v. Economou, the plaintiff filed
suit against members of the Department of Agriculture,107 claiming that certain
officials had instituted an investigation and an administrative proceeding in
retaliation for his criticism of the agency.108 The court of appeals held the agents
were entitled only to qualified immunity.109 The Supreme Court reversed and
held that the officials were entitled to absolute immunity.110
The United States, on behalf of the federal officials, argued that the officials
should be entitled to absolute immunity, even if the constitutional violation was
“knowing and deliberate.”111 The Supreme Court, engaging in a historical
101 See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224. Petitioner Forrester alleged that she was demoted and discharged on
account of her sex. Id. at 220–21. The respondent, a Circuit Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Illinois,
claimed judicial immunity for his decision. Id. at 222. The Forrester Court noted first that it had historically
been “quite sparing in its recognition of claims to absolute official immunity.” Id. at 224. The Court reasoned
that the act of firing a subordinate is functionally an administrative one and, thus, judicial immunity shall not
attach. Id. at 229. The Court did not determine whether the judge would have qualified immunity and instead
left the issue to the Seventh Circuit on remand. Id. at 230.
102 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976). In Imbler, a prosecutorial immunity case, the Supreme
Court analogized the principles underlying the common law immunity of prosecutors to the common law
immunity protecting judges and grand juries. Id. at 422–23. Having established a common law rule of immunity,
the Court concluded the same public policy considerations “countenance absolute immunity [for prosecutors]
under § 1983.” Id. at 424.
103 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
104 For a more detailed discussion of Stump, see supra note 101.
105 Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229.
106 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512–14 (1978) (detailing various safeguards).
107 Note that this is an action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the
federal common law equivalent to a § 1983 action. This is of particular importance because in deciding Bivens
case law, the Supreme Court is not directly bound by the statutory language of § 1983 but, rather, its own
judgment. Nevertheless, because the two actions are merely two sides of the federal/state coin, the Supreme
Court has stated that § 1983 case law is “instructive” in determining Bivens actions. Butz, 438 U.S. at 495–96.
Bivens case law is similarly instructive in § 1983 actions. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224–26; see also Antoine
v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 n.5 (1993).
108 Butz, 438 U.S. at 480.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 517.
111 Id. at 485.
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exploration of federal immunity akin to its exploration of § 1983 immunity,
rejected the proposition as “unsound.”112 Nevertheless, while the Court
acknowledged that the “extension of absolute immunity . . . to all federal
executive officials” would have a deleterious effect on the protections granted
by the Constitution,113 the Supreme Court held that the “Chief Hearing
Examiner, Judicial Officer, and prosecuting attorney” were entitled to absolute
immunity.114
The “cluster of [quasi-judicial] immunities” stem from “characteristics of the
judicial process.”115 Specifically, the Court noted that the “safeguards built into
the judicial process” reduce the need for damages actions as a check on judicial
officers because the “insulation . . . from political influence, the importance of
precedent . . . , the adversar[ial] nature of the process, and the correctability of
error on appeal” restrain even the most wicked judges.116 Because the federal
administrative adjudication shared several safeguards with the judicial process,
the Court explained absolute immunity was appropriate—the preservation of
“independent judgment” outweighed the risk of an unconstitutional act.117
One of the so-called Butz factors is “insulation from political influence”;118
thus, in a situation where extrajudicial pressure may influence the
decisionmaking process, absolute immunity may be inappropriate.119 In
Cleavinger v. Saxner, the plaintiffs were inmates in a Federal Correctional
Institute in Terre Haute, Indiana.120 Evidence was adduced that the plaintiffs
encouraged a work stoppage in order to protest the death of various inmates.121
Each plaintiff was tried before an Institution Discipline Committee.122 Each
plaintiff had a right to have a written copy of the charge; to be represented by
the prison staff; to be present at the hearing, call witnesses, and submit evidence;

112

Id.
Id. at 505.
114 Id. at 511–12.
115 Id. at 512.
116 Id. The Court has since referred to the listed safeguards as factors. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S.
193, 201–02 (1985) (“And in Butz, the Court mentioned the following factors . . . .”).
117 Butz, 438 U.S. at 514 (“In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk of an unconstitutional act by
one presiding at an agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the importance of preserving the independent
judgment of these men and women.”).
118 Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 202.
119 Id. at 203–04.
120 Id. at 194.
121 Id. at 194–95.
122 Id. at 195.
113
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and to have a written explanation of the committee’s decision.123 After the
proceedings, the plaintiffs were found guilty, placed in administrative detention,
and forced to forfeit “good time.”124 A proper appeal was filed to the warden;
the individuals were released from detention, their good time was restored, and
a note was placed directing officials that the incident “not reflect unfavorably”
during the parole hearing.125 The respondents then appealed to the Regional
Director of the Bureau of Prisons to have the incident expunged and the relief
was granted.126 Upon release, the plaintiffs filed suit in district court under
Bivens and won damages; the Seventh Circuit affirmed the holding and denied
the discipline committee’s argument for absolute immunity.127
Despite the existence of some judicial safeguards, the error correction on
appeal, and the eventual grant of “all the administrative relief they sought,” the
Supreme Court declined to extend absolute immunity in Cleavinger.128 The
Supreme Court agreed that the committee members performed an “adjudicatory
function.”129 Further still, the Court agreed that the process was adversarial in
nature, that harassment and retaliation for wrongful decisions were “more than
a theoretical possibility,” and that the prospect of damages suits would dissuade
officials from serving on the committee.130 Nonetheless, the Court was swayed
by the lack of independence on the discipline committee.131 The members of the
committee were necessarily passing judgment on their fellow co-workers—a
judgment subject to review by their superior, the warden.132 There existed an
“obvious pressure” to favor the institution they belonged to, their fellow coworkers, and not the inmate.133
The Court held that qualified immunity would suffice, as it more
appropriately balances the “opposing considerations”; the need, on the one hand,
to protect officials in their discretionary tasks and, on the other, to provide a
potential remedy for deprivations of constitutional rights.134 In so holding, the
Court explicitly contrasted the officials in Cleavinger with the judicial officials
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

Id.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 198–99.
Id. at 197, 203.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id. at 203–04.
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id. at 206–07.
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in Butz and noted that both the lack of independence and lack of “procedural
safeguards . . . under consideration in Butz” compelled qualified immunity over
absolute judicial immunity.135
Merely being a part of a judicial proceeding, even one with the full panoply
of procedural safeguards, is not sufficient to qualify for absolute judicial
immunity if there is no discretionary judgment involved.136 Antoine v. Byers &
Anderson, Inc., involved a court reporter who lost a trial transcript and failed to
produce it, resulting in a four year delay before the plaintiff’s criminal appeal
was heard.137 The plaintiff filed a Bivens suit against the court reporter and the
company that hired her.138 The Ninth Circuit applied absolute judicial immunity,
holding that the “tasks performed by a court reporter in furtherance of her
statutory duties are functionally part and parcel of the judicial process.”139
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit.140 First, the Court noted a
distinct lack of a common law analogue, stating that a “skilled, professional
court reporter of today was unknown” during the development of judicial
immunity.141 Second, the Court explained that a central component in extending
judicial immunity is the existence of a “functionally comparable . . .
discretionary judgment.”142 The lack of any discretionary judgment rendered
absolute immunity inapplicable, despite the arguably “indispensable” nature of
a court reporter.143 While the court reporter did not receive judicial immunity,
the Court did note that various circuits provide reporters a qualified immunity.144
After Antoine,145 there is an established framework for extending judicial
immunity to non-judicial officers. First, a lower court is tasked with determining
whether “[the] official was accorded immunity from tort actions at common law
when the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1871.”146 Second, if a counterpart is

135

Id. at 206.
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993).
137 Id. at 430–31.
138 Id. at 431.
139 Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 950 F.2d 1471, 1476 (9th Cir. 1991).
140 Antoine, 508 U.S. at 438.
141 Id. at 433.
142 Id. at 436 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423, n.20 (1976)).
143 Id. at 437.
144 Id. at 432.
145 Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n Antoine, the Supreme Court worked a
sea change in the way in which we are to examine absolute quasi-judicial immunity for nonjudicial officers.”
(quoting Curry v. Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2002))).
146 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986).
136
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found, the court must next determine whether § 1983’s history or purpose
counsels against recognition of the immunity.147 There must be sufficient
procedural safeguards such that a damages action is, on balance, an unwise
check on constitutional conduct when compared to the normal appellate
process.148 Further, the function performed must involve discretionary
judgment, otherwise, the function is more akin to an administrative or ministerial
activity that receives only qualified immunity.149 The immunity must be limited,
under Stump, to judicial acts.150 A central inquiry for applicability is whether the
function of the official is to “resolv[e] disputes between parties, or [to]
authoritatively adjudicat[e] private rights.”151
II. THE EXTENSION OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Professor Margaret Johns has noted that several circuits have extended
judicial immunity to mental-health experts in family law proceedings and
criminal prosecutions.152 Johns argues that medical experts appointed to assist
the courts should never receive judicial immunity: not only is there no 1871
common law analogue, but the experts neither perform a “decision-making
function” nor are “subject to the procedural safeguards of the judicial
process.”153 This is true. But while this statement aptly criticizes the lower
federal court’s application of judicial immunity, it implicitly preserves the
correctness of the functional approach of judicial immunity itself. Worse still,
while the Supreme Court has counseled that absolute immunity must be granted
“sparing[ly],”154 the analytic model does not easily provide support to that
contention. Thus, the scholarly critique’s focus is misplaced.155

147

Id.
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978).
149 Antoine, 508 U.S. at 436–37.
150 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
151 Antoine, 508 U.S. at 434 n.8 (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499–500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
152 Johns, supra note 8, at 277–79.
153 Id. at 279–80.
154 Burns, 500 U.S. at 487.
155 See Johns, supra note 8, at 275 (“Unfortunately, as the following discussion will show, the lower courts
have frequently disregarded the Supreme Court’s limitations on the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity in
several ways.”); Coriell, supra note 8, at 1000 (“While the Supreme Court has been ‘quite sparing’ in extending
absolute immunity, lower courts have regularly extended absolute immunity beyond the categories recognized
by the Supreme Court.” (footnote omitted)).
148
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While the historical and functional approach is intended to constrain lower
courts,156 the Supreme Court also allows “special functions” and policy
considerations157 to influence whether extension of immunity is appropriate.158
As the following cases show, it is no surprise that lower federal courts have taken
strands of historical, functional, and policy-based models in weaving an
immunity that blankets more officials than the Supreme Court would prefer.159
This Part proceeds in two sections. First, this Part examines the extension of
absolute judicial immunity in practice. This includes a survey of “typical” quasijudicial immunity cases and an examination of the language and reasoning
employed. Second, this Part reconciles the surveyed cases with Supreme Court
doctrine to demonstrate that the expansion of judicial immunity is not an
aberrant practice, but an expected consequence of a mercurial methodology.
A. The Extension of Absolute Judicial Immunity in Practice
1. The Third Circuit Approach
In Hughes v Long,160 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit extended
absolute judicial immunity to a licensed clinical social worker and a licensed
clinical psychologist on the theory that both were “arms of the court” that
performed “functions integral to the judicial process.”161 The Hughes court
noted that the analytical model required162 a historical approach followed by an
inquiry into § 1983’s purpose.163 The majority did not, however, engage in even

156 Burns, 500 U.S. at 493 (“[W]e look to the common law and other history for guidance because our role
is ‘not to make a freewheeling policy choice,’ but rather to discern Congress’ likely intent in enacting § 1983.”
(quoting Malley v. Briggs 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986))).
157 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978).
158 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
159 Consider, for example, the Second Circuit’s language in a pair of cases known as Gross I, Gross v. Rell,
585 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and Gross II, Gross v. Rell, 695 F.3d 211 (2d Cir. 2012). In Gross I, the Second
Circuit referred to quasi-judicial immunity as a “simpl[e] appl[ication]” of the Cleavinger factors. Gross I, 585
F.3d at 81. In Gross II, the Second Circuit doubled-down and reiterated that quasi-judicial immunity is—as the
Supreme Court has advised—determined with “reference to the six factors described in Cleavinger.” Gross II,
695 F.3d at 213. This approach eschews historical considerations and is both a correct application of Supreme
Court precedent—chiefly Butz, 438 U.S. at 512 (laying out the six factors for quasi-judicial immunity), and
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985) (restating the Butz factors)—and an arguable misapplication of
the historical approach in Antoine. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433 (1993).
160 242 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2001).
161 Id. at 127.
162 Id. at 125 (“[A] court must first determine whether [an official had immunity at common law]” (emphasis
added)).
163 Id.
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a scintilla of historical analysis. Instead, the Third Circuit squarely approached
the issue under the “functional approach” to see if there were any “special
functions” or liability issues that counseled in favor of extending immunity.164
Specifically, the court noted that the “neutral fact-finding and advis[ory]”
functions the officials performed were “intimately related and essential to the
judicial process” because it aided the court in making a discretionary
judgment.165
Hughes is emblematic of the reasoning employed by lower federal courts in
this field.166 Although the Court did not engage in any historical analysis, lower
courts are concerned with other articulated Butz factors167: the need to assure
that the individual officer can perform her discretionary duty without fear of
liability168 and the presence of safeguards and lack of outside influence.169 These
concerns, taken seriously, stretch judicial immunity beyond its historical
confines.
2. The Ninth Circuit: An Ahistorical Approach
The Ninth Circuit has explicitly depended on the Butz factors—as opposed
to a more constrained historical analysis—in deciding quasi-judicial immunity
questions.170 In Meyers v. Contra Costa County Department of Social Services,
164

Id. (first citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 506; then citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)).
Id. at 127.
166 Morstad v. Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 147 F.3d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that quasi-judicial
immunity extended to court appointed psychologist because the function performed was “essential to the judicial
process”); Turney v. O’Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 1474 (10th Cir. 1990) (granting the superintendent of a hospital
and psychologist quasi-judicial immunity when performing actions pursuant to a judicial order); Moses v.
Parwatikar, 813 F.2d 891, 892 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a psychiatrist appointed by the court was entitled to
judicial immunity for performing “functions essential to the judicial process”); Williams v. City of New York,
No. 03 Civ. 5342RWS, 2005 WL 901405, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2005) (holding that a social worker received
judicial immunity when performing “functions that were integral to the judicial process”); see also Lander, supra
note 9, at 904–14 (contrasting the Third Circuit’s approach to mental-health expert immunity with other courts
of appeals).
167 The Court listed six factors: (1) “the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without
harassment or intimidation;” (2) “the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as
a means of controlling the unconstitutional conduct;” (3) “insulation from political influence;” (4) “the
importance of precedent;” (5) “the adversary nature of the process;” and (6) “the correctability of error on
appeal.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985) (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
168 Turney, 898 F.2d at 1474.
169 Hughes, 242 F.3d at 126–27 (“[Defendants] were not acting under any time constraints and were not
forced to make ‘snap judgments’ . . . . Rather, [defendants] took six months to complete their evaluations and
did so in a deliberate, methodical, and thorough fashion.”).
170 See, e.g., Meyers v. Contra Costa Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 1154, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 1987)
(citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
165
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the Ninth Circuit was tasked with determining whether a social worker and
employees of California’s Family Conciliation Court and Department of Social
Services were entitled to immunities.171 The court granted the social worker,
Haaland, absolute prosecutorial immunity for testimony given during the
custody hearing,172 but did not extend either prosecutorial immunity or quasijudicial immunity for Haaland’s allegedly ordering the plaintiff father to stay
away from his home.173 The majority engaged in both a functional and a policybased analysis on the latter point.174 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit panel held
that the conduct did not “contribut[e] to an informed judgment by an impartial
decisionmaker” and was undertaken in the “absence of such ‘safeguards built
into the judicial process.’”175 For the Meyers court and the Supreme Court in
Butz, the “balance” strikes in favor of absolute immunity when the
characteristics that breed the “cluster of immunities”176 are present, not
historical, considerations.
The employees, Allison and Crossley, were both granted quasi-judicial
immunity.177 The pair was accused of conspiring to refuse visitation rights to the
plaintiff and of biasing foster parents.178 The Court determined that the officers
performed their duties pursuant to a court order and statute.179 Although the
defendants were accused of violating the court order, the Meyers court held that
only an action “completely outside the scope of [Allison and Crossley’s]
jurisdiction” would strip them of their immunity.180 Judicial immunity applied
because the defendants did not exceed that scope.181

171 Specifically, the court was weighing prosecutorial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity, and qualified
immunity. Id. at 1155. While prosecutorial immunity may be a species of quasi-judicial immunity, Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Quasijudicial immunity . . . . that is, official acts involving policy discretion but not consisting of adjudication.”), it is
often given the separate, distinct label of “prosecutorial immunity.”
172 Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1155–56.
173 Id. at 1157.
174 Id. at 1157–58 (“Haaland’s ordering of Meyers away . . . [is not] quasi-judicial . . . . Furthermore, the
policy considerations that support quasi-judicial immunity do not apply to Haaland’s action.”).
175 Id. at 1157–58 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1159.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. This analysis is functionally identical to the Bradley Court holding that only an action in “clear
absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter” would leave the officer bereft of immunity. Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351–52 (1871).
181 Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1159.
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3. The Derivative or Arm of the Court Approach
The Ninth Circuit’s ahistorical, policy/functional-based approach has been
replicated in a myriad of contexts by other circuits. For example, receivers182
often receive absolute judicial immunity.183 Davis v. Bayless184 offers a
prototypical example of the language and reasoning employed by lower federal
courts in receivership judicial-immunity cases.
As long as the judge appointing the receiver is afforded judicial immunity,
the receiver will derivatively acquire judicial immunity as well, if acting within
the scope of her authority.185 In Bayless, the debtor doctor failed to pay a
malpractice judgment and a receivership was appointed to seize assets to satisfy
the judgment.186 At the time, the doctor lived with his girlfriend, Lana Davis,
and her daughter; an attorney, acting on behalf of the judgment creditor,
appeared at the Davis home to search for assets.187 The attorney perused Davis’s
underwear drawer, read private mail, and refused to leave.188 Shortly thereafter,
the receiver received a court order to search storage units associated with Davis
and her family.189 The receiver searched the storage unit and seized $5600 cash,
family jewelry, and an oil painting.190 Davis was never notified of the search.191
Davis filed suit and alleged that the receiver and attorney violated her
constitutional rights.192 The defendants argued they were entitled to absolute
judicial immunity.193
182

A receiver is a disinterested person, typically appointed by a court, for the protection or collection of
property that is the subject of competing claims—commonly because the property belongs to a bankrupt person
or is the subject of litigation. Receiver, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
183 Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 557 (11th Cir. 1994); New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d
1298, 1303–04 (9th Cir. 1989); T & W Inv. Co. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d 801, 803 (10th Cir. 1978); Kermit Constr.
Corp. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Poceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976). But see Teton Millwork Sales v.
Schlossberg, 311 F. App’x 145, 150–52 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that receiver exceeded scope of order and thus
could not receive quasi-judicial immunity).
184 70 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 1995). This case was chosen partly due to its memorable facts and partly because
Professor Johns uses the case in her article. See Johns, supra note 8, at 290–91. Because this Comment addresses
Johns’s concerns and arguments, it will wrestle with what Johns has observed to be a “striking example of the
erroneous extension of judicial immunity to receivers.” Id. at 290.
185 Bayless, 70 F.3d at 373.
186 Id. at 371.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 371–72. The attorney did eventually leave, albeit with several pairs of the girlfriend’s underwear.
Id.
189 Id. at 372.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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The attorney did not receive absolute judicial immunity, partly for prudential
reasons194 and partly because she was a private party.195 The receiver did receive
absolute immunity.196 The court first noted that a receiver would receive
immunity “derivative of the appointing judge’s judicial immunity.”197 Because
a state judge authorized the receivers’ actions and because the state judge did
not act “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction” by issuing a general order, the
receiver was entitled to receive derivative immunity.198 This entitlement would
fail if the receiver acted beyond the scope of the court order.199 Without much
analysis, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the receiver did not act beyond the
scope of the order and thus received judicial immunity.200 Although Davis had
her property searched and seized, she was left without notice and without
remedy.
Bayless did not purport to examine the historical purpose of the receiver, nor
did it expressly consider the function a receiver serves. Indeed, only three facts
were ostensibly of any importance: (1) the receiver acted as an “arm of the
court,” (2) the judge was generally allowed to issue such orders, and (3) the
receiver stayed within the scope of the order.201 Although unstated, these facts
touch upon the policy/functional approach endorsed by the Supreme Court. By
framing a receiver as an “arm of the court,” Bayless implicitly suggested that the
receiver performed a role part and parcel with core judicial functions.202 Because
the immunity is derivative, factors that counsel in favor of immunity for judges
similarly counsel immunity for the derivative officer.203 A Kekuléan204 knot of

194 Id. at 374–75 (“The Supreme Court has said that absolute immunity should be extended no further than
its justification warrants.”).
195 Id. at 374.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 373. This is concerning. Because a judge will often receive judicial immunity—as long as the
judge acts within her jurisdiction, immunity is virtually guaranteed—logically, a receiver will almost always be
eligible for absolute immunity.
198 Id. at 374.
199 See id.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 373–74.
202 See id. at 374 (citing Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1981)).
203 See, e.g., Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2013) (elaborating policy
considerations supporting derivative immunity).
204 Kekuléan is a classic Wallace-ism, stemming from the literary genius of David Foster Wallace, the
renowned author of Infinite Jest. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, INFINITE JEST 5 (Little, Brown & Co. 1996) (“I stare
carefully into the Kekuléan knot of the middle Dean’s necktie.”). Kekuléan most likely refers to organic chemist
August Kekulé’s discovery of benzene’s annular molecular structure. Kekulé has stated that he discovered the
ring shape of the benzene molecule after dreaming about a snake eating its own tail. JOHN READ, FROM ALCHEMY
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logic, this approach to derivative immunity poses no outer limits on who can be
cloaked by quasi-judicial immunity.
A final case, Martin v. Hendren, illustrates the extreme lengths to which the
functional and policy-based approach can be taken. During a traffic charge
hearing, the mother of the defendant, Paula Martin, approached the bench
without permission.205 After refusing to return to her seat, the judge ordered
defendant Officer Hendren to remove her.206 During the struggle, Martin was
struck in the face by Hendren, flipped face down onto the floor, handcuffed,
pulled to her feet by her hair and handcuffs, and ultimately led out of the court.207
She allegedly suffered a shoulder injury.208 She filed a § 1983 suit for damages,
and the officer claimed absolute quasi-judicial immunity.209
The court held that absolute judicial immunity applied as the defendant
derived his immunity from the presiding judge’s immunity.210 The Hendren
court cited favorably the Supreme Court opinion in Mireles v. Waco,211
specifically its emphasis on the nature of the function performed and the policy
reasons behind judicial immunity.212 Although the Seventh213 and Tenth
Circuit214 have dealt with the Hendren fact pattern differently, Hendren remains
good law in the Eighth Circuit. This circuit split underscores the confusion and
lack of uniformity that pervades the courts of appeals.
B. Reconciling the Cases with Supreme Court Doctrine
Although Professor Johns points out that the workers in Hughes likely should
not have received quasi-judicial immunity, it is less clear whether the precedent
has been misapplied.215 Professor Johns argues that mental-health experts
neither perform judicial acts nor “resolve disputes between parties.”216 She also
CHEMISTRY 179–80 (Dover 1995). This self-devouring, self-ratifying, ouroboros logic is typical of the
derivative immunity approach.
205 Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 1997).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. The judge acquired immunity because he issued a valid order, within his judicial capacity, and within
his jurisdiction. Id.
211 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam).
212 Hendren, 127 F.3d at 721–22.
213 Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2001).
214 Martin v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 909 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1990).
215 See Johns, supra note 8, at 279–82.
216 Id. at 281.
TO
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notes that there is no historical analogue to the function mental-health experts
perform or a historical basis for extending immunity.217 But neither Cleavinger
nor Antoine refused to extend judicial immunity solely based on the historical
approach or the judicial act inquiry. Rather, Cleavinger focused on the lack of
certain Butz factors,218 and Antoine keyed in on the lack of discretionary
judgment in addition to the weak historical basis.219 Thus, the key consideration
that drives Butz, Cleavinger, and Antoine is not history or function, but policy.
If policy is key, then Hughes and similar decisions are much more palatable.
Indeed, it is a “freewheeling”220 choice that the Supreme Court has—likely to
its chagrin—mandated.
The policy considerations in Butz and its progeny necessitate Hughes. Unlike
Antoine, the medical experts in Hughes exercised discretionary judgment in
compiling reports and in making recommendations to the court.221 Unlike
Cleavinger, there is no significant “obvious pressure”222 to favor a specific party;
indeed, the experts were chosen by the court and not by either party.223 Like in
Butz, the Hughes proceeding contained the full panoply of procedural
safeguards, including the right to appeal an adverse decision.224 While the
particular functions the Hughes experts performed did not contain any specific
safeguards, the report was used in a safeguarded judicial proceeding.225 Further,
the experts deliberated over a six-month period and not in a “snap [fashion],”226
similar to the judicial officers exercising reasoned judgment in Butz.227
217

Id.
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 203–04 (1985); see supra text accompanying notes 118–35.
219 Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 433, 436–37 (1993); see supra text accompanying
notes 136–44.
220 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (“[W]e look to the common law and other history for guidance
because our role is ‘not to make a freewheeling policy choice,’ but rather to discern Congress’ likely intent in
enacting § 1983.” (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986))).
221 The Hughes court described the function of the mental-health experts as “neutral fact-finding and
advis[ory].” Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2001). While “neutral fact-finding” implies something
less than discretionary judgment, this is not quite the “verbatim” recording of the Antoine court reporter. Antoine,
508 U.S. at 436. In any event, the “advisory” role played by mental-health experts lends further force to moving
the Hughes experts closer to an official displaying discretionary judgment and farther from the rote activity of a
court reporter.
222 Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 204.
223 Hughes, 242 F.3d at 123. There is not an institutional pressure similar to the one that existed in
Cleavinger. The experts in Hughes were passing judgment neither on fellow co-workers nor on individuals
subordinate to them in the institutional structure. Both issues were present in Cleavinger. 474 U.S. at 203–04.
224 Hughes, 242 F.3d at 123. In fact, Hughes did appeal the order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania,
only to withdraw the appeal. Id.
225 See id. at 127.
226 Id.
227 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978).
218
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Thus, although the extension of quasi-judicial immunity to mental-health
experts may not be in the “sparing” spirit the Supreme Court has repeatedly
asked for,228 it does fit well within established Supreme Court precedent. Indeed,
by focusing largely on policy considerations in both extending and refusing to
extend judicial immunity, the Supreme Court has affirmatively created the
“freewheeling” policy-making it purports to condemn.229
The “derivative” and “arm of the court” case lines, of which Bayless and
Hendren are stark examples, present a more troublesome fit within Supreme
Court doctrine.230 On the one hand, the analytical model does not pretend to take
into account historical considerations, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition
for immunity.231 However, the derivative analysis does dovetail nicely with a
functional or policy-based inquiry.
The immunity is derived from the judge and, as the cases illustrate, the first
inquiry is whether the judge would receive immunity.232 This requires an inquiry
into whether the judge undertook judicial action that was within the court’s
jurisdiction.233 There is an implicit assumption that the judge’s orders satisfy the
procedural question and the execution of the order is necessarily a judicial
function.234 Thus, to the extent that the Supreme Court disfavors derivative
228

Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487 (1991).
Id. at 493 (“[W]e look to the common law and other history for guidance because our role is ‘not to
make a freewheeling policy choice,’ but rather to discern Congress’ likely intent in enacting § 1983.” (quoting
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986))).
230 Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 374 (5th Cir.
1995). Professor Jeffries has argued that Bayless is more readily understood if the scope of quasi-judicial
immunity was “purely definitional—that is, whether the defendant’s actions were in some sense ‘judicial’ . . . as
the receiver acted with judicial authorization.” Jeffries, supra note 26, at 219–20. If quasi-judicial immunity is
not justified by a definitional model but instead by Jeffries’s “functional” model, then Bayless is wrong. Id.
Because the Bayless plaintiff was unable to pursue a judicial remedy, as there was no decision to appeal, then
quasi-judicial immunity should be unavailable. Id. at 220. With respect to Jeffries’s first observation, this
Comment argues that the receiver’s actions were not judicial. A receiver is not a judge and the receiver did not
resolve a dispute between parties nor authoritatively adjudicate private rights. To extend quasi-judicial immunity
due to a judge’s “authoriz[ation]” of an action is to design a boundless immunity—follow the thread long enough
and nearly all actions are “authorized” by a judge. With respect to Jeffries’s second observation, the mere
availability of appeal would similarly fabricate an immunity of limitless application. If the receiver’s report was
a part of a proceeding that could be appealed, then under Jeffries’s phrasing, quasi-judicial immunity would be
appropriate. Instead, the relevant—and proper—consideration should be whether the officer is the equivalent of
a judge, not whether the litigant could effectively appeal an adverse result. For further commentary, see infra
Part III.
231 Burns, 500 U.S. at 497 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
232 Hendren, 127 F.3d at 721; Bayless, 70 F.3d at 373.
233 See Bayless, 70 F.3d at 373 (“[T]he proper inquiry is . . . whether the challenged actions were obviously
taken outside the scope of the judge’s power.” (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 (1978))).
234 See Hendren, 127 F.3d at 721 (“[Judicial] orders unquestionably [relate] to the judicial function.”).
229
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analysis, the frailty of the derivative model is not readily found when compared
to the Cleavinger and Butz approach.
The circuits take various approaches to judicial immunity questions. A social
worker in the Third Circuit will almost certainly receive judicial immunity,
while a social worker in the First, Second, or Seventh Circuit may receive only
qualified immunity.235 A probation or parole officer preparing a report will
almost certainly receive absolute judicial immunity in the Second,236 Fifth,237
Ninth,238 Tenth,239 Eleventh,240 and D.C. Circuits.241 A recent Sixth Circuit242
(unpublished) opinion suggests a probation or parole officer preparing a report
will only have qualified immunity; similar holdings have been found in the
Fifth,243 Eighth,244 and Ninth245 Circuits, suggesting possible intra-circuit splits
as well as an inter-circuit split. This haphazard application of immunity
disadvantages both plaintiffs and defendants. Federal rights and defenses should
not depend on the legal jurisdiction in which one works or lives. A uniform
approach is necessary.

235 Compare Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 131 (3d Cir. 2001), with Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell,
182 F.3d 89, 98–99 (2d Cir. 1999), and Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 933 (1st Cir. 1992), and Millspaugh v.
Cty. Dep’t of Pub., 937 F.2d 1172, 1177 (7th Cir. 1991).
236 Peay v. Ajello, 470 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2006); Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1987).
237 Freeze v. Griffith, 849 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1988).
238 See Desilva v. Baker, 96 P.3d 1084, 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (citing federal cases applying absolute
judicial immunity to probation officers who filed a false presentence report in a § 1983 action brought in state
court).
239 Tripati v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 784 F.2d 345, 348 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying
absolute immunity to pretrial bond report and presentence report); Hummel v. McCotter, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1322,
1330 (D. Utah 1998) (holding absolute immunity applied to the preparation of a presentence report).
240 Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1984); see also Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256,
1258 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Chesser favorably).
241 Turner v. Barry, 856 F.2d 1539, 1541 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
242 Draine v. Leavy, 504 F. App’x 494, 496 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that an officer who
prepares a parole violation report is entitled only to qualified immunity). But see Loggins v. Franklin Cty.,
Ohio, 218 F. App’x 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a probation officer’s advice to the sentencing court
entitles the officer to quasi-judicial immunity); Horton v. Martin, 137 F. App’x 773, 775 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding
that absolute immunity applies to parole board members as well as “those who make recommendations
concerning parole” in relation to parole hearings); Balas v. Leishman–Donaldson, No. 91-4073, 1992 WL
217735, at *5 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1992) (per curiam) (applying absolute immunity to a parole officer).
243 Galvan v. Garmon, 710 F.2d 214, 214 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
244 Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370, 374–75 (8th Cir. 1984).
245 Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a parole officer preparing a report
is not entitled to absolute immunity).
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III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND REFINING A MUDDLED METHODOLOGY
Having identified the problem, this Part proposes a potential solution. To
ameliorate the haphazard application of immunity, this Comment suggests
formalism as an antidote: judicial immunity for judges, qualified immunity for
the rest. This Part has two sections. First, this Part lays out the case for formalism
by juxtaposing the negatives of the current regime with the positives of a
formalist approach. Second, this Part establishes that the Supreme Court is the
best body to curb the expansion of quasi-judicial immunity and applies a
formalist approach.
A. Judicial Immunity for Judges, Qualified Immunity for the Rest
An overly expansive absolute immunity regime disserves the public. Civilrights laws are undermined as victims are denied a remedy, deterrence is
weakened, and constitutional boundaries lay undefined.246 Such costs would be
justified if there were a significant benefit. But, as it stands, the extension of
absolute immunity serves none but the particularly malicious. This problem is
magnified by the fact that the prototypical honest, fair-dealing public officer
receives the considerably powerful qualified immunity defense.247
The policies of § 1983 are disserved as well by the extension of absolute
immunity. The primary purpose of § 1983 is to “give a remedy to parties
deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s
abuse of his position.”248 Absolute immunity denies that remedy.249 As Professor
Johns aptly writes, absolute immunity fails to give “concrete meaning to abstract
constitutional language.”250 The limits of a government official’s actions are
often defined and established in constitutional tort litigation;251 thus, to the
extent that absolute immunity restricts the “capacity of constitutional doctrine to

246

See Johns, supra note 8, at 314.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has described the protection of qualified immunity as extending to
“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013)
(citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011)).
248 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961).
249 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 434 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
250 See Johns, supra note 8, at 315.
251 James K. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV.
LIBERTIES L. REV. 393, 446 (2003) (“[M]ost of the rights regulating a government official’s discretion to inflict
injury upon individuals have been established in constitutional tort actions.”).
247
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adapt,”252 this Comment argues that it is a step too far in favor of protecting the
independence of judicial officers.
Reducing the absolute immunity regime, and turning instead to qualified
immunity “has constitutional benefits.”253 As Professor Jeffries has argued, a
limitation on money damages can “foster[] the development of constitutional
law.”254 Qualified immunity, for example, shields government officials from
liability when they violate a constitutional right that has not been clearly
established.255 This shield makes it less costly for a court to declare a new
right—to “innovat[e],” in Jeffries’s terms256—because, while the defendant in
the present case is not liable, future officials are on notice and future victims can
point to clearly delineated constitutional boundaries.257 An expansive absolute
immunity regime, however, does not have the attendant constitutional benefits.
Rather than providing for the lively development of constitutional doctrine,
absolute immunity stultifies growth and renders constitutional doctrine
vulnerable to ossification. This problem of underdeveloped or static law is
particularly concerning where, as noted prior, the question of judicial immunity
or qualified immunity is circuit-dependent.258 The Constitution is the supreme
law of all the land and its growth (or stagnation) should not be a mere matter of
geography.

252 John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 97 (1999) (“My
endorsement of constitutional change does not reflect a taste for it. . . . But it reflects a conviction that the
capacity of constitutional doctrine to adapt to evolving economic, political, and social conditions is a great
strength.”).
253 Id. at 90. As then-Judge Sotomayor stated in Wilkinson:

By taking this opportunity to address constitutionality in advance of immunity, we have begun the
difficult process of identifying particular conduct falling inside and outside of acceptable
constitutional parameters. In this way, and at the Supreme Court’s urging, we hope to “promote[]
clarity in the legal standards for official conduct.” Indeed, from this day forward, these and other
case workers should understand that the decision to substantiate an allegation of child abuse on the
basis of an investigation similar to but even slightly more flawed than this one will generate a real
risk of legal sanction.
Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
254 Jeffries, supra note 252, at 90. This limitation on damages is often referred to as a “right-remedy” gap.
Id. at 87.
255 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
256 Jeffries, supra note 252, at 90.
257 See id. at 90, 108–09.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 235–45; see also Johns, supra note 8, at 267 n.5; Lander, supra note
9, at 911–14.
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When absolute immunity is applied, the court dismisses the action without
considering the underlying merits.259 Although qualified immunity analysis no
longer requires a court to determine whether the Constitution was violated,260 an
enterprising judge may still consider the underlying merits and promote the
development of constitutional law. If a judge is uncomfortable deciding the
constitutional question—perhaps out of a concern that otherwise innocent court
officials would be liable for merely carrying out the orders of the judicial
officer—then the judge could hold that the officer did not violate clearly
established law. Ultimately, qualified immunity serves as an appropriate vehicle
to balance competing values: remedying constitutional wrongs while protecting
the discretion of public officials.261
A formalist approach that this Comment proposes—judicial immunity for
judges, qualified immunity for the rest—has several beneficial effects: (1) it
keeps easy cases easy, (2) it reverses the erosion of basic constitutional
guarantees,262 (3) it promotes constitutional innovation,263 and (4) it
accommodates the competing values of private protection and public
discretion.264 The preceding paragraphs have already touched on the latter three
benefits. As for the first listed benefit, a case application will suffice.
In Martin v. Hendren,265 the Eighth Circuit granted absolute immunity to a
court police officer, reasoning that carrying out a judge’s orders is
“unquestionably” part and parcel with the judicial function.266 Richman v.
Sheahan267 and Martin v. Board of County Commissioners268—Seventh Circuit
and Tenth Circuit cases, respectively—answered the same question differently.
In all three cases, police officers acted pursuant to a judicial order and physically
accosted the plaintiffs, allegedly using excessive force.269 Although Richman
259 See, e.g., Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 722 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that quasi-judicial immunity
applied, granting summary judgment for the defendant and stating that the court “need not speculate about
hypothetical situations testing the limits of our holding”).
260 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
261 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
262 See supra Part II; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505 (1978) (“The extension of absolute
immunity from damages liability to all federal executive officials would seriously erode the protection provided
by basic constitutional guarantees.”).
263 See supra text accompanying notes 250–61.
264 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
265 Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997); see supra text accompanying notes 205–14.
266 Hendren, 127 F.3d at 721.
267 270 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2001).
268 909 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Martin] (per curiam).
269 Richman, 270 F.3d at 433–34; Hendren, 127 F.3d at 721; Martin, 909 F.2d at 403–04. In Richman,
fourteen police officers restrained a disruptive witness, forced him to the floor, and sat on him; while he was
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and Martin apply qualified immunity, both panels focused on whether the
function performed was ultimately executive or judicial.270 While this led to this
Comment’s preferred result, such reasoning in closer cases—such as Hendren—
will lead to the opposite result.
This Comment argues that it is not enough to merely distinguish the function
performed as “judicial” or “executive.” A functional approach does not constrain
a court from making “freewheeling” policy decisions;271 it does not induce a
court to remain “cautious in extending [immunities].”272 The Richman court
expressed concern that that expansion of immunity could create unjust results
with respect to plaintiffs harmed by the “unlawful conduct [of] those who
enforce [judicial orders].”273 But taking that concern seriously, it makes little
sense to distinguish between whether harm flows from the order itself or from
the execution of the order. In both cases, the officer was engaging in unlawful
conduct, with the only difference stemming from the initiator of the unlawful
action—a judge in the former instance, an officer in the latter.
A formalist approach would simplify the matter. Where the suit is aimed at
the judicial officer, absolute immunity is appropriate.274 If the suit, however, is
aimed not at the judicial officer, but at the executors of the order, then qualified
immunity should apply. Thus, unlike with absolute immunity, which protects
even the “knowingly unlawful or plainly incompetent,”275 a plaintiff could

restrained, he stopped breathing and, ultimately, died. Richman, 270 F.3d at 433–34. Hendren was described in
greater detail earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 205–14. Martin involved officers executing an arrest
warrant. Martin, 909 F.2d at 403. The plaintiff had been discharged from a hospital prior to her arrest with
instructions to exit in a wheelchair and return to bed. Id. at 404. Instead, she was forced to walk to a police van,
ride to jail, and sit in the van for some time without medical attention, thereby aggravating her existing injuries.
Id.
270 Richman, 270 F.3d at 438; Martin, 909 F.2d at 405. The Martin court did not refer specifically to the
“executive” function, but did speak to the manner in which the orders were carried out, language reflective of
whether the executive or judicial function was implicated. Id. at 405 (“We conclude that absolute immunity does
not protect defendants from damage claims directed . . . to the manner of [an order’s] execution.”); see also
Richman, 270 F.3d at 438 (“[C]onduct—the manner in which [officers] enforced the judge’s order—implicates
an executive, not judicial, function.”).
271 Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986).
272 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226 (1988).
273 Richman, 270 F.3d at 438–39.
274 See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). Mireles involved facts similar to Richman,
Hendren, and Martin. Id. at 10 (reciting the facts of Mireles). The only difference is that the plaintiff sued the
judge and the police officers executing the order. Id.
275 Richman, 270 F.3d at 438. Knowingly unlawful or plainly incompetent certainly, one would think,
describes the actions of the officers in Richman, Hendren, and Martin.
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recover if the relevant law was clearly established and the defendant had violated
it.276
Formalism would not only tidy the law, but would also make it uniform for
both potential plaintiffs and defendants across the land. A social worker in the
Third Circuit would receive qualified immunity, as her colleagues currently do
in the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits.277 A probation or parole officer
preparing a report would receive qualified immunity, resolving the possible
intra-circuit split in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and a larger inter-circuit split.278
The jurisprudence would rid itself of terminological niceties like “derivative
immunity” and “arm of the court”;279 a court could retire the Butz factors and the
vestigial “cluster of immunities.”280
B. Applying Formalism
This next section applies formalism to illustrate its benefits in § 1983
litigation. First, it deals with stare decisis in the § 1983 context and explains why
the Supreme Court is obligated to reverse the expansion of quasi-judicial
immunity. Second, this Part examines the derivative and arm of the court case
lines, elaborates how the current functional approach has led to that outgrowth,
and then applies a formalist approach.
1. Stare Decisis in the § 1983 Context
Stare decisis promotes predictability, evenhandedly and consistently
developing legal principles, and adds actual and perceived integrity to the
judicial process.281 Yet, in the judicial immunity context, continued commitment
to Supreme Court precedent has led to the opposite result: an unpredictable
expansion of judicial immunity,282 a complete lack of consistent development of
legal principles,283 and a reduction in the perceived integrity of the judicial

276 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (articulating the qualified immunity standard). This
approach brings quasi-judicial immunity in-line with its historical roots. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,
132 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that, historically, quasi-judicial immunity was closer to “what we now
call ‘qualified,’ rather than absolute, immunity”).
277 See supra note 235.
278 See supra notes 236–45.
279 See supra text accompanying notes 184–204.
280 See supra text accompanying notes 115–17; see also supra note 167.
281 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
282 See supra text accompanying notes 235–45.
283 See supra Part II.
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process.284 To reverse this trend, this Part argues that the Supreme Court should
reexamine its judicial immunity jurisprudence and apply a formalist approach.
Although not an “inexorable command,”285 the considerations undergirding
stare decisis are particularly applicable in the statutory context.286 But in the
context of § 1983287 and other civil-rights statutes, the Court has shown
considerable adaptability in reconsidering precedent.288 This adaptability
reflects an appreciation of the constitutional dimension that § 1983 occupies and
the fundamental importance of reinterpreting the statute in light of constitutional
developments.289 Two developments in particular require the Court to reexamine
the contours of judicial immunity: (1) the considerable strength of qualified
immunity today compared to when Stump was decided, and (2) the emerging
inter- and intra-circuit splits.
284 For example, both legal scholars and news commentators have panned the Supreme Court’s decision in
Stump. See, e.g., JOEL D. JOSEPH, BLACK MONDAYS: WORST DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, 254–57
(1987); Block, supra note 42, at 916–20; Marianne Schwartz O’Bara, Note, Stump v. Sparkman: Judicial
Immunity or Imperial Judiciary, 47 UMKC L. REV. 81, 90–91 (1978). Professor Block has criticized Stump as
“the worst sort of self-dealing by the judiciary.” Block, supra note 42, at 880. The Washington Post ran an
editorial criticizing the decision as a “deeply disturbing step toward judicial omnipotence.” Editorial, Judicial
Omnipotence, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/03/31/
judicial-omnipotence/251ed69d-bb44-4bf8-bdac-d2c9852ca5f9/. Justice Rehnquist has noted the partiality of
judicial immunity as well. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 528 n.* (1978).
285 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)).
286 Id.
287 Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Monroe, was particularly adamant that the Court had an obligation to
construe § 1983 properly and that it could not shirk its duty with reference to stare decisis. He said:

And with regard to the Civil Rights Act there are reasons of particular urgency which authorize the
Court—indeed, which make it the Court’s responsibility—to reappraise in the hitherto skimpily
considered context of [§ 1983’s history] what was decided [previously]. This is not an area of
commercial law in which, presumably, individuals may have arranged their affairs in reliance on
the expected stability of decision. Nor is it merely a mine-run statutory question involving a narrow
compass of individual rights and duties. The issue in the present case concerns directly a basic
problem of American federalism . . . . In this aspect, it has significance approximating
constitutional dimension. Necessarily, the construction of the Civil Rights Acts raises issues
fundamental to our institutions. This imposes on this Court a corresponding obligation to exercise
its power within the fair limits of its judicial discretion.
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 221–22 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
288 Compare Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191 (finding that the word “person” in § 1983 does not apply to
municipalities), with Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–92 (1978) (reversing Monroe and
concluding that the word “person” in § 1983 does include municipalities).
289 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 672–73 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis applied less rigorously to civil rights cases); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 221–
22 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1369–78 (1988) (describing exceptions to statutory stare decisis). Moreover, the Court itself has stated in the
context of judge made rules, such as judicial immunity, that “change should come from [the] Court,” as such
rules implicate the internal workings of the Judicial Branch. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233–34.
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First, because qualified immunity was significantly less powerful when
Stump was decided,290 the Court should revisit its judicial immunity
jurisprudence.291 In Harlow, the Court removed the “subjective aspect” of
qualified immunity: the “permissible intentions” or malice formulation.292 This
change was made because, in the Court’s language, it was finally “clear that
substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government
officials.”293 No longer a purely subjective standard, the now familiar objective
standard protects all but the knowingly malicious or plainly incompetent.294
Further, the doctrine does not require a judge to decide whether a constitutional
violation occurred, allowing judges to dismiss cases based on clearly established
law.295
Second, the emerging circuit split296 constitutes an important issue for the
Supreme Court, warranting review of its judicial immunity precedent.297
Uniformity in the federal law is an important goal—so much so, that federal
courts are indeed constitutionally tasked to ensure uniformity within the federal

290 Stump was decided in 1978, while Harlow was decided in 1982. The qualified immunity standard in
1978 was:

[Qualified] immunity would be unavailable . . . if the official “knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the [individual] affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention
to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the [person].”
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978) (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
291 In quasi-judicial cases since Harlow, the Court has held that judicial immunity should not apply, while
referencing the qualified immunity. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 432 (1993) (“Some
Circuits have held that court reporters are protected only by qualified immunity.”); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S. 193, 206 (1985) (“Qualified immunity, however, is available to these committee members.”). In a preHarlow case, the Court held that officials involved in administrative adjudication were clothed with absolute
immunity. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978). For a fuller discussion of all three cited cases, see
supra text accompanying notes 106–44.
292 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
293 Id. at 816.
294 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
295 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009).
296 See supra text accompanying notes 235–45; see also Johns, supra note 8, at 267 n.5; Lander, supra note
9, at 910–14.
297 See SUP. CT. R. 10(a).

FOROUZAN GALLEYSPROOFS3

156

9/26/2016 8:49 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:123

law.298 Uniformity creates “equal protection of the laws,”299 reifying familiar
abstract constitutional ideals. Because the Supreme Court has sowed the seeds
of confusion that currently plague the federal system,300 it is the Court’s duty to
rectify its judicial immunity jurisprudence: the antidote, as this Comment
argues, is a formalist approach.
This section has argued why the Supreme Court should reexamine its judicial
immunity jurisprudence and apply a formalist approach. Importantly, a formalist
approach does not create absolute liability for public officials. Cognizant of the
compelling arguments for both parties in § 1983 litigation, this Comment merely
proposes that qualified immunity—designed to accommodate both parties’
concerns—be the norm for non-judicial officers.301 A brief example of what the
Court could change will be illustrative—the next section will apply a formalist
approach.
2. Donning the Robe or Removing the Shield: Formalism Applied
Although federal courts vary in their approaches to judicial immunity, the
derivative and arm of the court approach is consistent amongst the circuits.302
For example, in Bush v. Rauch, the Sixth Circuit held that a Probate Court

298 See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 183 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our principal responsibility
under current practice, however, and a primary basis for the Constitution’s allowing us to be accorded
jurisdiction to review state-court decisions, see Art. III, §2, cls. 1 and 2, is to ensure the integrity and uniformity
of federal law.”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 416 (1821) (“[T]he necessity of uniformity, as
well as correctness in expounding the constitution and laws of the United States, would itself suggest the
propriety of vesting in some single tribunal the power of deciding . . . all cases in which they are involved.”);
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816) (arguing that if there was not a uniform
interpretation of federal law, “[t]he public mischiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly
deplorable”). Commentators are in accord with the preceding judicial pronouncements. See, e.g., Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1731, 1812 n.451 (1991) (explaining that circuit splits jeopardize the integrity of the federal judicial system
because “uniformity is a prominent aspiration”); Sandra Day O’Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (“[A] single sovereign’s laws should be applied equally to all . . . .”); Peter L. Strauss,
One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial
Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1096–97 (1987) (explaining that, due to practical restraints,
the Supreme Court can only afford to rectify “systematic variation in the application of national law. In general,
[it is] more aggravating if citizens of Maine and Florida are threatened with having to live under different
understandings of the same federal statute . . . .”).
299 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
300 See supra Part II.
301 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—
the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”).
302 See supra text accompanying notes 183–214; see also Coriell, supra note 8, at 1000–06.
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Administrator was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for his decision to place a
juvenile in a non-secure detention home.303 After concluding that the
administrator did not act in a judicial capacity, the majority reasoned that he was
an “arm of the court” performing actions “basic and integral [to] the judicial
function.”304 Thus, he was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.305
The “functions integral to the judicial process” approach is emblematic of
derivative and arm of the court case lines.306 The Court could eliminate these
case lines by incorporating a formalist approach to judicial immunity. Instead of
determining whether a function is judicial—whether an individual “exercise[s]
a discretionary judgment” as a part of his or her function307—the Court could
instead use the “expectation” approach in Stump308 or require that the discretion
relate to judicial judgment.309
Under this formalist approach, the defendant-administrator in Rauch would
not receive quasi-judicial immunity. The administrator neither engaged in the
authoritative adjudication of private rights, nor did he resolve a dispute between

303 Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847–48 (6th Cir. 1994). The Administrator, Rauch, had concluded that the
juvenile was non-violent and could be placed in the non-secure detention home owned by the plaintiffs. Id. at
845. After placement, the juvenile physically assaulted and injured the plaintiff-owner of the home. Id. A
subsequent investigation revealed that the juvenile had a history of violent behavior and that the Administrator
had been negligent in his investigation. Id. The plaintiffs then sued under § 1983. Id.
304 Id. at 847.
305 Id.
306 See supra text accompanying notes 183–214.
307 Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436 (1993) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 423 n.20 (1976)).
308 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978) (“[A]n act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one . . . [if the function
performed is] to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.”).
This approach is only partly formalistic because it could also be used to apply judicial immunity—if
appropriate—to certain parole boards, mediators, or arbitrators. The key inquiry is not whether the individual is
a judge, but whether she is expected to “resolv[e] disputes between parties, or [authoritatively adjudicate] private
rights.” Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435–36 (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part)). This approach would maintain the core of judicial immunity, while
jettisoning its outer-boundaries (such as the protection of any action essential to the judicial process) to the realm
of qualified immunity. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[Judicial]
immunity was absolute [in 1871], but it extended only to individuals who were charged with . . . authoritatively
adjudicating private rights. When public officials made discretionary policy decisions that did not involve actual
adjudication, they were protected by . . . what we now call ‘qualified’ . . . immunity.”).
309 In this sense, the “discretion” would be to decide in favor of one party or another. This is both formalistic
and functional. The officer would be adjudicating private rights and her discretion would be in respect to her
final decision. This is materially different from how lower courts use the “discretion” language today. See, e.g.,
Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that a mental-health professional receives absolute
immunity for aiding the court in performance of its discretionary duties). The Hughes approach is one
discretionary step too far.
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parties; thus, judicial immunity would be inappropriate under a formalist
approach.310 The absence of judicial immunity in this case, however, would not
result in liability; qualified immunity would, instead, provide the proper
protection.311 This change is not superficial. The Sixth Circuit would consider
the underlying constitutional question312—thereby developing and furthering
constitutional standards—while properly accommodating plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ interests.313 This framework starkly contrasts the normal, quasijudicial case in which a court does not consider the constitutional question and
instead considers only the pressing interests of the relevant public official.314
Although a formalist approach would not result in liability under the facts of
Rauch, a formalist approach would allow for liability—assuming qualified
immunity is breached—in cases where a constitutional violation is committed
by an arm of the court. Consider, for example, the case of Martin v. Hendren,
discussed prior.315 In Hendren, the defendant officer removed the plaintiff from
the courtroom by striking her in the face, flipping her onto the floor, handcuffing
her, and pulling her to her feet by the hair and handcuffs.316 The officer received
derivative quasi-judicial immunity for having performed actions
“unquestionably related to the judicial function.”317
A formalist regime would not extend quasi-judicial immunity so far. The
Eighth Circuit’s recitation of the facts shows that the police officer neither
decided a dispute between parties nor authoritatively adjudicated private
rights.318 Thus, the police officer would only receive qualified immunity.
Reading the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,319 the officer’s force
would not be objectively reasonable and, thus, the conduct would be a violation

310 See Bush, 38 F.3d at 847 (“The district court found that . . . [the defendant] was not acting in a judicial
capacity . . . .”).
311 Id. at 848 (explaining that, even in the absence of absolute immunity, the defendant would receive
qualified immunity).
312 The Sixth Circuit did, in fact, consider the constitutional question in this case. Id.
313 See supra note 301.
314 See Valdez v. City & Cty. of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[A]bsolute immunity
always comes at a price. The individual wrongly deprived . . . will be unable to pursue a remedy . . . . But the
public interest . . . far outweighs the benefit to be gained by providing the defendants . . . with only limited
immunity.”).
315 See supra text accompanying notes 205–12, 265–69.
316 Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 1997).
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id.
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of clearly established law.320 At the least, the Eighth Circuit would be able to
determine the contours of excessive force and provide notice to public
officials.321
CONCLUSION
In 1978, the Washington Post referred to the decision in Stump v. Sparkman
as a “step toward judicial omnipotence.”322 Since that time, lower federal courts
have crafted a shield of omnipotence that reaches far beyond judicial officers.
Scholars have framed this tale as lower federal courts run amok, a failure to
apply precedent.323 This Comment proposes that the truth is not so simple. In
large part, this is also a story about the faithful application of a muddled
methodology and the creation of a freewheeling, policy-driven tribunal. This
expansion has harmed both plaintiffs and defendants and has resulted in federal
rights and defenses being dependent on geography.
To rectify the over-expansion of judicial immunity, this Comment proposes
a clear solution: judicial immunity for judges and judicial officers, qualified
immunity for the rest. The implications of the proposal are far-reaching. First,
such an approach would advance the normative ideal of uniformity and equal
protection under the law.324 Second, the proposal properly balances the public’s
interest in zealous officials with the public’s interest in accountability. A
formalist regime advances the policy undergirding absolute immunity—which
supports zealous officials325—while qualified immunity allows for greater
accountability and constitutional innovation.326 Third, a formalist approach
eliminates the derivative and arm of the court case lines327 and, thus, fits within
the Supreme Court’s “sparing” approach to quasi-judicial immunity.328

320

See generally Montoya v. City of Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 2012). Montoya involved a set of
facts similar to Hendren. The Eighth Circuit held it was both a violation of the Constitution and of clearly
established law to “throw to the ground a nonviolent, suspected misdemeanant who was not threatening anyone,
was not actively resisting arrest, and was not attempting to flee.” Id. at 873.
321 See supra text accompanying notes 252–61.
322 Editorial, Judicial Omnipotence, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 1978), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/politics/1978/03/31/judicial-omnipotence/251ed69d-bb44-4bf8-bdac-d2c9852ca5f9/.
323 See Johns, supra note 8, at 267; Coriell, supra note 8, at 986–87.
324 See supra text accompanying notes 296–300.
325 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978) (“Absolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that
[officials] can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.”).
326 See supra text accompanying notes 251–61.
327 See supra notes 183–214 and accompanying text.
328 Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
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Although formalism contrasts with the Supreme Court’s “functional”
approach, the Court’s language is used to expand judicial immunity, not cabin
it.329 The expansion of quasi-judicial immunity suggests it is time to reconsider
the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s methodology. Having sowed the seeds of
confusion, the onus falls upon the Supreme Court330 to earnestly inquire into the
propriety of its judicial immunity jurisprudence and consider a formalist regime.
Without such an examination, the lower courts will remain split on factual
contexts,331 the policies of civil-rights litigation will continue to be disserved,332
and courts will remain free to haphazardly apply judicial immunity.
SEENA FOROUZAN∗
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weigh in. There is precedent for this. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309, 110
Stat. 3847 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)). This amendment further protected judicial officers,
amending 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to bar injunctive relief against judicial officers unless “a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
331 See supra text accompanying notes 235–45; see also Johns, supra note 8, at 267 n.5; Lander, supra note
9, at 910–14.
332 See supra Part III.A and text accompanying notes 247–61.
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